Mixed ownership, managerial incentives and bank competition by Saha, B. & Sensarma, R.
Mixed Ownership, Managerial Incentives and Bank
Competition∗
Bibhas Saha† Rudra Sensarma‡
Abstract
We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition
one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses man-
agerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare
(with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nation-
alization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit-linked
managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less
nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate com-
petition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit-linked managerial
incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.
Keywords: banking, privatization, nationalization, mixed duopoly, managerial incentive
JEL classification numbers: G21, L13, L33.
∗Correspondence: Dr Rudra Sensarma, University of Hertfordshire Business School, Hatfield, Herts,
AL10 9AB, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 1707285456; Fax: +44 (0) 1707285455; Email: rsensarma@gmail.com.
†School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK; E-mail: b.saha@uea.ac.uk
‡Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Hertfordshire Business School, Hat-
field, Herts, AL10 9AB, UK; E-mail: rsensarma@gmail.com.
1
1 Introduction
Mixed ownership in banking is a common feature across different economic systems. While
profit considerations led to privatization of many state-owned banks in transition economies,
state presence has been frequently observed in banking sectors all over the world. See Barth
et al (2001) for evidence on EU countries, Sherif et al (2003) for transition economies and
Shirai (2002) for China and India. Even in the Anglo-Saxon economies, the recent credit
crisis of 2007 subsequently led to nationalization of many banks and financial institutions.
At the same time, entry of private and foreign banks is typically subject to state control.
There is also wide-spread evidence of managerial incentive schemes in the corporate world
including in banks.1 While such incentives are usually profit enhancing, it is also believed
that they were partly responsible for the recent failures of the banking industry. It is,
therefore, reasonable to expect that the banking industry in many economies resembles
mixed oligopoly with strategic interactions among banks occurring at many dimensions.
We study such interactions between a partially public bank and a private bank by allowing
the former to choose the degree of public ownership and the latter managerial incentive
prior to engaging in deposit or interest rate competition. Examining such interactions will
also help us understand some elements of the recent banking crisis.
We assume that the government is a social welfare maximizer, but is also somewhat
profit oriented. This profit orientation forces the government to privatize the public bank
to some extent, even if there is no other bank in the market. The presence of another
bank makes the government internalize some of the strategic effects that state ownership,
howsoever partial, might have on the other bank’s profit. On its part, the private bank can
counter the competitiveness of the public bank by offering revenue-linked incentives to its
manager. The combination of managerial incentives and profit orientation will cause even
greater privatization of the public bank. As a consequence, a particular type of mixed
duopoly emerges in which privatization is always partial and the private bank always
1See Jensen et al (2004) for a comprehensive review of managerial incentives and Hubbard and Palia
(1995) for evidence from U.S. banking. On emerging economies, see Eriksson (2005) and Kato and Long
(2006) for evidence on pay-performance relationships in the Czech Republic and China.
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departs from (pure) profit maximization. More interestingly, in this mixed duopoly the
government’s profit orientation determines a certain level of industry profit, and the private
bank’s managerial incentives scheme forces a transfer of profit from the public bank to
the private bank leaving the social welfare unchanged. This pure redistributive role of
managerial incentives is possible only in a mixed duopoly, and this has not been identified
earlier in the literature.
We also observe that the combination of partial nationalization and managerial incen-
tive improves social welfare from the level of pure duopoly (involving only private banks)
without managerial incentive. Since we assume that there is no competition in the loan
market, this result suggests that in the context of the recent banking crisis nationalization
and managerial incentive (in the deposit market) might be helpful if competition in the
loan market is somewhat muted.2
We then consider the case of interest rate competition with deposit differentiation where
we show that the private bank will offer profit-linked incentives to its manager in equilib-
rium. The reason for incentives to be profit-linked is that the interest rate appears on the
cost side of the private bank’s balance sheet and two interest rates are strategic comple-
ments. Therefore, by linking reward to profit the managers are essentially induced to cut
the interest rate, which will be reciprocated by the other bank as well (due to strategic
complementarity). This is consistent with the price competition result of Fershtman and
Judd (1987). As for privatization, the result depends on the degree of deposit differen-
tiation. If the two markets are fairly apart then the government does not worry about
the adverse effects of nationalization on the private bank (because such effects would be
minimal) and maximizes social welfare through full nationalization. On the other hand, if
the two deposits are close substitutes then the government cares about the adverse effects
spilling over to the second market, and tends to reduce the public bank’s interest rate
by undertaking partial privatization. Here, due to deposit differentiation it is difficult to
2The recent asset protection scheme of the UK government, that insures bank loans, eliminates downside
risks in lending and is similar to providing a safe rate of return which we have assumed in our model. This
scheme will moderate competition in the loan market and mitigate the risk profiles of participating banks.
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ascertain whether the managerial incentives are merely redistributive as they were under
deposit competition. Nevertheless, here too managerial incentives are proving to be an
effective means of countering the effects of nationalization.
While there is a vast literature on bank competition starting from the works of Monti
(1972) and Klein (1971), non-profit maximizing motives in banking have been rarely ex-
amined. Purroy and Salas (2000) studied competition between a profit maximizing private
bank and a savings institution. Their savings institution exhibits ‘expense preference be-
havior’, i.e. utility maximization where utility is a weighted average of profit and workers’
wage-bill. They show that the private bank can partly restore the asymmetry created by
the savings institution’s utility function by offering managerial incentives. However their
results cannot be generalized to public banks and the question of privatization cannot be
addressed. Our model tries to fill this gap.
There are many papers that have studied mixed duopoly, but partial privatization
concerns only a few (such as Fershtman, 1990; Matsumura, 1998). Even fewer papers
have studied mixed duopoly in the banking context (except Purroy and Salas, 2000; Saha
and Sensarma, 2004). But there is a large literature on managerial incentives following
the seminal work of Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). We
integrate these two literatures with the objective of simultaneously determining optimal
privatization and managerial incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model and section 3
discusses optimal privatization and managerial incentives. Section 4 considers the case of
interest rate competition. The concluding section discusses policy implications.
2 The Model
We consider a two-stage game between a partially public and a fully private bank. In the
first stage, the government decides on the share of public ownership in the partially public
bank, while the private bank decides on managerial incentives. In the second stage the
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two banks engage in deposit competition.3 Profits are subsequently realized. We solve the
game by backward induction i.e. we first derive the equilibrium deposits (stage 2) and
then the equilibrium ownership and managerial incentives of the public bank and private
bank respectively (stage 1).
The public bank is indexed 0, and the private bank indexed 1. Depositors are paid
interest rate r by the following rule: r = b(D0 + D1), b > 0. Here D0 and D1 are the
deposits collected by the public and the private bank respectively while b denotes the slope
of the deposit supply curve. On the revenue side, both banks face a constant rate of return
R on each unit of investment made out of these deposits.4 Fixed R can be justified by
assuming that money markets and loan markets are competitive, where banks are price
takers, though they can have market power in raising deposits. The public bank is jointly
owned by the government and a private partner, and the choice of the volume of deposit is
made by the bank’s board of management consisting of a government representative5 and
the private partner. If the private partner had full ownership, it would have maximized
pi0 = (R− r)D0 by choosing D0 as
D0 =
R− bD1
2b
. (1)
Denote this hypothetical reaction function as ˆRF0. On the other hand, if the bank
was under full state ownership, the government representative in the public bank would
maximize social welfare, which is defined as the sum of depositor surplus (DS) and profit,
and given by SW = DS +
∑1
0 pii, where DS = rD −
∫ D
0
bzdz = rD − bD2
2
= bD
2
2
, or
SW = (R − bD
2
)D, where D = D0 + D1. The government representative would maximize
3When interest rate is regulated, as in many developing economies, banks tend to compete more in
deposit.
4This is a simplification. The basic qualitative results do not change if R varies inversely with D.
However that would require an analysis of the loan market which we abstract from in this paper. We
can also allow for a statutory reserve ratio, in which case R is to be taken as an average rate of return,
averaged over the reserve deposit and investible deposit.
5An example is UK Financial Investments, the company set up by the UK government to manage its
stakes in partially nationalized banks.
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SW by choosing D0 as
D0 =
R− bD1
b
. (2)
which would have been its reaction function. We denote it as ˜RF0.
However, there must be a balance between the profit maximizing objective of the private
partner and the social welfare objective of the government representative. This can be
modeled in a number of ways. We take the approach suggested by Fershtman (1990)
in which the public bank’s deposit choice is given by a weighted reaction function, where
weights are applied on the two extreme reaction functions - fully public (2) and fully private
(1), and the weights directly correspond to their respective shares of ownership. Thus, the
reaction function of the public bank is RF0 = θ ˜RF0 + (1 − θ) ˆRF0 where θ (θ ∈ [0, 1]) is
the degree of public ownership.6 This can be rewritten as
D0 =
(1 + θ)(R− bD1)
2b
. (3)
It is noteworthy that Fershtman (1990) did not provide an objective function of the
partly nationalized firm leaving it an open issue.7 However, first Saha and Sensarma (2004)
and then Kumar and Saha (2008) have suggested two alternative objective functions that
can support Fershtman’s reaction function.8 Either can be used as a justification in the
present context.
While the public bank’s deposit choice is specified in the above manner, it may be
6Even if there is some discontinuity at an ownership level of 50 percent, we assume that the bank’s
behavior is responsive to small changes in ownership.
7Fershtman (1990, pp. 327) cites Bos and Peters (1989) for a detailed discussion on the objective
function of a partly nationalized firm. But the issue was, nevertheless, unsettled.
8Saha and Sensarma (2004) showed that if the government representative wanted to maximize the
depositor surplus for the public bank’s depositors, then Nash bargaining between him and the private
partner would result in this reaction function. Kumar and Saha (2008) show that if the objective function
of a partially public firm is given by a weighted average of social welfare and profit, which follows the
approach of Matsumura (1998), then also the above reaction function emerges. In our model if we write
the objective function of the partially public bank as: αSW + (1−α)pi0 = α[R− bD2 ]D+ (1−α)[R− r]D0,
where α = 2θ1+θ , then by differentiating this objective function with respect to D0 we arrive at the reaction
function given by (3).
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preceded by a decision of how much to divest or privatize, and this decision lies at a
higher level of government, whose concern is to maximize social welfare and possibly at
the same time ensure solvency of the banks. Governments and regulators are known to be
concerned about firm and industry performance especially in the banking industry where
it is linked to financial stability. A variety of measures such as safety nets, recapitalization,
entry regulation etc. are employed by governments to ensure that banks are solvent and
profitable. Aghion et al (1999) emphasized the importance of solvency in their analysis of
different bail-out rules for banks in transition economies. See also Allen and Gale (2004).9
While our model is deterministic and cannot allow for potential losses and bank runs,
we introduce the concern of government for industry profits by modifying its objective
function. Thus, the government chooses θ to maximize a modified social welfare function
which places a higher weight on profit. The modified social welfare function is denoted as
V = DS + β(pi0 + pi1) which can be rewritten as V = SW + (β − 1)(pi0 + pi1).10 With
β > 1, the government demonstrates its profit orientation by placing an additional positive
weight on profit in its social welfare objective. An alternative formulation could be to set
β = 1 but place a profit constraint on the banks.11 Note that the government’s objective
function differs from the objective of the government representative in the public bank’s
management board. However, this difference is only in terms of the profit orientation.
The private bank, though technologically identical to its public counterpart, may hire
a manager and offer her incentives to boost its profit. Following the strategic delegation
literature (see Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Skilvas, 1987), we assume a
linear incentive scheme which may reward (or penalize) the manager for generating revenue
beyond the standard profit maximizing level. Formally, the manager is instructed to choose
D1 to maximize M = (1− ρ)pi1 + ρRD1.
9Allen and Gale (2004) write, “If the government is concerned with financial stability it may ensure
that banks survive by regulating entry in different regions.”
10Matsumura (1998) used a similar formulation in a non-banking context but with the government
placing a higher weight on consumer surplus.
11Such a formulation would play an equivalent role as our modified social welfare function. Saha and
Sensarma (2004) showed that when the public bank has to meet a reservation profit, the government is
forced to restrict its degree of nationalization.
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Depending on the owner’s preference, ρ can take a wide range of values. The standard
case of profit maximization is given by ρ = 0. But if ρ > 0, the manager is encouraged
to pursue sales more than profit. Conversely, ρ < 0 implies that the manager will be
encouraged to pursue profit more than sales.
The manager maximizes the above objective function and her choice of D1 gives the
private bank’s deposit reaction function
D1 =
R− (1− ρ)bD0
2b(1− ρ) . (4)
The reaction curves of the two banks as given by (3) and (4) are shown in figure 1.
Two thick curves, denoted as RF0 and RF1 are drawn with the assumption that θ ∈ (0, 1)
and ρ ∈ (0, 1
2
). The downward slopes indicate that the deposits are strategic substitutes.
If the private bank chooses zero deposit, the public bank will choose its monopoly deposit
as (1+θ)R
2b
, and similarly, if the public bank chooses zero deposit the private bank’s manager
will choose D1 =
R
2b(1−ρ) . Conversely, if the private bank chooses D1 =
R
b
, the public bank
will simply close down, and similarly, the public bank’s choice of D0 =
R
b(1−ρ) will force the
private bank to close down. Thus, the monopoly and entry-deterring levels of deposits of
each bank can be defined in the usual way as quantity setting firms’ outputs are defined.
The equilibrium deposits are given by point M comprising of D∗0 and D
∗
1, which we obtain
as
D0 =
R(1 + θ)(1− 2ρ)
b(3− θ)(1− ρ) ,
D1 =
R[(1− θ) + ρ(1 + θ)]
b(3− θ)(1− ρ) . (5)
It is clear that we must have ρ < 1
2
for D0 to be positive. If indeed it were the case that
ρ ≥ 1
2
, the public bank would be forced to close down, and the private bank would mobilize
D1 =
R
b
; however its profit will fall to zero, which also suggests that the private bank will
never set ρ > 1
2
. This extreme situation is described by the two dashed reaction curves. On
the other extreme, if θ = 0 and both banks were profit-maximizers (i.e. ρ = 0) we would
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have a pure duopoly. Both reaction curves would shift inward and we have the Cournot
Deposits as D0 = D1 =
R
3b
. This is given by point N at the intersection of two thinner
reaction curves. Since point M lies North-East of N , it is clear that the mixed duopoly
generates much greater individual and aggregate deposits than the private duopoly.
As can be seen from (5), managerial incentive of the private bank and privatization of
the public bank will both favor the private bank, and hurt the public bank in terms of
their deposit choice. Formally, ∂D0
∂ρ
< 0, ∂D0
∂θ
> 0, ∂D1
∂ρ
> 0, ∂D1
∂θ
< 0, if ρ < 1
2
.
Finally, if the private bank had set ρ < 0, its output would fall against any given
θ, because its reaction function would shift inward starting from the situation of profit
maximization. Consequently, its deposit would fall below the pure duopoly level. However,
such a scenario is never profitable for the private bank. Therefore, we will not consider
ρ < 0. Henceforth, our attention will be restricted to ρ ∈ [0, 1
2
] under deposit competition.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
3 Optimal privatization and managerial incentives
We now move to the first stage of the game and analyze the strategic interactions in terms
of managerial incentives and privatization. For this we need to derive the private banks’s
profit and the government’s modified social welfare from the second stage equilibrium.
Utilizing (5) we get
V =
R2[2− ρ(1 + θ)][2− ρ(1 + θ) + β(1− θ)(1− 2ρ)]
b(1− ρ)2(3− θ)2 , (6)
pi0 =
R2(1− θ2)(1− 2ρ)2
b(1− ρ)2(3− θ)2 , (7)
pi1 =
R2(1− θ)(1− 2ρ)[(1− θ) + ρ(1 + θ)]
b(1− ρ)2(3− θ)2 . (8)
A crucial point to note is that both for pi1 > 0 and pi1 > 0 it is necessary that θ < 1.
Without some privatization two banks cannot operate. Further, in the pure duopoly case,
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i.e. when θ = ρ = 0, each bank earns pi = R
2
9b
.
The government and the private bank determine their respective choice variables, viz.
θ and ρ, simultaneously. The private bank’s owner chooses ρ by maximizing (8) as follows
ρ(θ) =
1 + θ
5 + θ
.
This is the private bank’s ‘incentive reaction function’, which is upward sloping in θ
(see figure 2). Starting from a situation of complete nationalization, as the public bank
increases divestment (i.e. reduces θ), D0 fall, D1 rises (assuming ρ <
1
2
), the private bank
then reduces its aggressiveness by cutting down on its sales incentives (or incentives to
mobilize deposits). Alternatively stated, in a situation of pure duopoly, the private bank
can enjoy its highest profit by setting ρ = 1
5
. Now if the government gets some stake in the
rival bank, the private bank will experience a loss in profit. To make up for the lost profit,
it will then raise its revenue incentive above 1
5
. Thus, greater the θ, greater is ρ. Thus,
managerial incentive is strategic complement to nationalization, or strategic substitute to
privatization (which is measured by (1− θ)).
To solve for the public bank’s response, we maximize V with respect to θ. This yields
θ =
2− β − ρ(1 + β)
β − ρ(3β − 1) .
Notably, if β = 1, optimal θ is 1 regardless of ρ. Several points are noteworthy. First,
given ρ < 1
2
and β > 1, government’s choice of privatization is partial. That is, θ ∈ (0, 1).
Second, when ρ = 0, the resulting privatization is still partial, 0 < θ < 1. This is because
the government is now concerned about profit, and driving depositor surplus to its max-
imum by setting θ = 1 involves inflicting loss on both banks. Given β > 1 that cannot
be optimal. Third, from the government’s point of view nationalization (privatization)
and managerial incentives are strategic substitutes (complements), as θ′(ρ) < 0. This is
exactly opposite of the perspective the private bank has. This is where mixed duopoly
is crucially different from pure duopoly. As the government is not only concerned about
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private bank’s profit, but also values the industry profit relatively more than depositor
surplus, it internalizes some of the negative effects on profit that would follow from aggres-
sive deposit mobilization by both banks. So when the private bank is expected to increase
its deposit incentives (thus induce greater aggression by its manager in the second stage),
the public bank divests its ownership to reduce the public bank’s aggression, in order to
contain the overall level of deposit mobilization. Thus, the government accommodates the
private bank’s aggression through privatization.
We derive the Nash equilibrium from the intersection of the two reaction functions, i.e.
the nationalization reaction function of the public bank and the incentive reaction function
of the private bank. Equilibrium θ and ρ are given as follows
θ∗ =
3− 2β
2β − 1 , ρ
∗ =
1
4β − 1 . (9)
The solution is graphically shown in figure 2. In order to ensure an interior solution we
need to assume that vertical intercept of the nationalization reaction function is greater
than that of the incentive reaction function. This gives an upward limit on β, i.e. β < 3
2
.
Beyond this level of β, the government becomes too profit oriented and hence would prefer
to fully privatize the public bank. Therefore, for β ∈ (1, 3
2
), (10) gives the equilibrium
solution of θ and ρ.
(Insert Figure 2 here)
We can contrast this solution with two situations. First, if there were no private banks
at all, what would be the optimal privatization? This can be determined by considering
that if D1 = 0 optimal D0 would be
(1+θ)R
2b
yielding V M = R
2
8b
(1 + θ)[(1 + θ + 2β(1 − θ)]
and maximizing vM one obtains the optimal θ as 1
2β−1 . This optimal privatization depends
only on β. If however, β = 1, θ∗ = 1, i.e. divestment under monopoly is optimal only
if there is profit concern. Second, if the government had no additional concern for profit
(i.e. if β = 1) its reaction curve would be vertical at θ = 1 and the only Nash equilibrium
is then ρ = 1
3
and θ = 1. This gives rise to a strange situation. Both banks make zero
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profit, and yet mobilize strictly positive deposits. At ρ = 1
3
we can see from figure 1 both
D0 > 0, D1 > 0, though the private bank remains aggressive in the deposit competition,
its aggressiveness hardly pays off. But this is also not a situation where the private bank’s
best response is to exit. Thus, both banks will be stuck in a state of insolvency.
The mixed duopoly literature generally highlights the aggressiveness of public ownership
and how it can force private firms to suffer loss and even exit; but what has not been
considered at all is the potential response of the private firms. By using sales-oriented
managerial incentives the private firms can prevent their exit from the industry, albeit
earning only zero profit. So the managerial incentive can be seen as a survival strategy of
private firms in the face of complete nationalization. In this environment, therefore, the
government can make the mixed duopoly solvent by having some additional concern for
profit. Of course, an immediate implication of the profit concern is that the government
will be forced to internalize some of the strategic effects of managerial incentives, and
therefore will divest more. We now summarize our main result.
Proposition 1 If the government is profit oriented, (i.e. β > 1), the Nash equilibrium
is characterized by the public bank being partially privatized and the private bank offering
managerial incentives. Compared to the ‘no managerial incentives’ case, privatization will
be greater. With an increase in β, equilibrium θ and ρ fall.
While we have already discussed the equilibrium responses, here we consider the effect
of an increase in β. A rise in the profit orientation of the government leads to greater
privatization, and lower managerial incentives. Here the θ reaction curve shifts to the
right, and the ρ reaction curve remains unaffected. Hence equilibrium θ and ρ decline.
Thus, a higher profit orientation of the government induces both banks to move towards
profit maximization behavior, and reduce their competitiveness.
Finally we check the social welfare implications of partial privatization and managerial
incentives. Recall that SW = (R− bD
2
)D, where D is the total deposit. It can be easily seen
that SW is an increasing function of D as long as R > bD (which holds in equilibrium).
Hence higher D would mean higher social welfare. Therefore comparing social welfare in
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two situations boils down to comparing total deposits. From the second stage equilibrium
deposits as given in (5) we derive the total deposit as
D =
R[2− ρ(1 + θ)]
b(1− ρ)(3− θ) (10)
Next we substitute the equilibrium values of θ and ρ from (9) in (10) and obtain the
equilibrium value of D which is
D∗ =
Rβ
b(2β − 1)
We would like to compare D∗ with the aggregate deposits of two cases: (i) pure duopoly
without managerial incentives, and (ii) mixed duopoly without managerial incentives. In
the first case, total deposit is D = 2R
3b
which is obtained by substituting ρ = θ = 0 in
(10). Since β > 1, D∗ > 2R
3b
. That is, social welfare is higher in the mixed duopoly as
compared with the case of a private duopoly without managerial incentives. In the second
case, we derive the aggregate deposit by substituting θ = 2−β
β
(which is the optimal value
of θ when ρ = 0) in (10). This yields D = Rβ
b(2β−1) which is exactly same as D
∗. Therefore,
social welfare in the mixed duopoly with managerial incentives is same as that in a mixed
duopoly without managerial incentives. Since D is same in both situations, depositor
surplus is also same and therefore the industry profit is also unchanged. But we know from
(7) that the public bank’s profit will fall with an increase in ρ. Then it must be the case
that with managerial incentives the public bank’s profit has fallen and the private bank’s
profit has risen, by exactly the same amount. Thus, the managerial incentive is playing a
merely redistributive role with no effect on efficiency, which is entirely determined by the
government’s profit orientation.
We believe, this is a new insight into managerial incentives. In a pure duopoly man-
agerial incentives (offered by two private banks) lead to mutual over-production, which
generates higher social welfare, but lowers industry profit. In a mixed duopoly with en-
dogenous privatization, the government internalizes the strategic effects on the private
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bank and thus softens the intensity of deposit competition by privatizing appropriately.
The extent of privatization will however depend on the extent of profit orientation. If, for
instance, the government is not at all profit oriented (β = 1), industry profit will be zero;
but with managerial incentives the private bank will still be able to induce a redistribu-
tion of deposits with however no profit to redistribute. But if β > 1, the government’s
concern for industry profit will be greater and its optimal privatization in the absence of
managerial incentive will ensure an industry profit of pi = R
2β(β−1)
b(2β−1) . If now the private bank
offers managerial incentives, the government will further divest, so that the industry profit
and social welfare remain unchanged, but the private bank’s profit rises at the expense of
the public bank’s and this redistribution of profit will take place via a redistribution of
deposits. The following proposition summarizes our finding on social welfare.
Proposition 2 Social welfare in a mixed duopoly with equilibrium privatization and man-
agerial incentives is higher than that in a private duopoly without managerial incentives;
but it is same as that in a mixed duopoly without managerial incentives. Thus in a mixed
duopoly, managerial incentives become merely redistributive having no efficiency effect.
4 Interest rate competition
Now we consider interest rate competition. Suppose deposits are differentiated as D0
and D1, which the public bank and the private bank collect in the market. These when
invested fetches a common and constant rate of return R. The total cost to a representative
depositor of supplying the two deposits is
C(D0, D1) = b
(
D20
2
+
D21
2
)
+ δD0D1
where δ is the degree of substitutability between the two deposits; 0 < δ < b. This is
analogous to the total utility of a representative consumer in a model of differentiated
goods in the price competition literature (see Singh and Vives, 1984).
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Considering the profit maximizing and price taking behavior of a representative depos-
itor, who is trying to choose D0 and D1 so as to maximize pi = r0D0 + r1D1 − C(D0, D1),
one obtains r0 =
∂C
∂D0
and r1 =
∂C
∂D1
. From these we get the inverse supply curves for
deposits as
r0 = bD0 + δD1,
r1 = bD1 + δD0.
We may note that our earlier model can be retrieved from this model by setting δ = b.
From these inverse supply curves we derive the direct supply curves as
D0(r0, r1) =
b
b2 − δ2 r0 −
δ
b2 − δ2 r1, (11)
D1(r0, r1) =
b
b2 − δ2 r1 −
δ
b2 − δ2 r0. (12)
Social welfare is defined as W = R[D0(r0, r1) +D1(r0, r1)]− C(D0(r0, r1), D1(r0, r1)).
If the public bank were fully government owned, it would have maximized W with
respect to r0 and set r˜0 =
(b−δ)
b
R+ δ
b
r1. On the other hand, if the bank were fully privately
owned, it would have maximized pi0 = [R− r0]D0(r0, r1) by setting rˆ0 = R2 + δ2br1.
The interest rate reaction function of the partially nationalized bank is
r0 = θr˜0 + (1− θ)rˆ0 = [(1 + θ)b− 2θδ]
2b
R +
δ(1 + θ)
2b
r1. (13)
Now consider the private bank. It hires a manager and offers her a managerial incentive
scheme (as earlier explained), M = (1−ρ)pi1 +ρRD1(r0, r1), where pi1 = [R−r1]D1(r0, r1).
As before, our interest is to see whether ρ = 0 or otherwise. The interest rate reaction
function of the private bank chosen by its manager is, therefore,
r1 =
R
2(1− ρ) +
δ
2b
r0. (14)
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Solving (13) and (14) we obtain the equilibrium interest rates, conditional on (θ, ρ), as
r0 =
Rb
[4b2 − δ2(1 + θ)]
[
2 {b(1 + θ)− 2δθ}+ δ(1 + θ)
1− ρ
]
, (15)
r1 =
R
[4b2 − δ2(1 + θ)]
[
2b2
1− ρ + δ {b(1 + θ)− 2δθ}
]
. (16)
It can be shown that while both r0 and r1 are increasing in ρ as well as in θ, θ has a
stronger effect on r0 than on r1, and likewise ρ has stronger effect on r1 than on r0 (see
Appendix 1).
Now we consider the first stage problem of solving the simultaneous choice of θ and ρ.
First consider the private bank’s optimization. It will maximize pi1 = [R − r1]D1(r0, r1)
where r0 and r1 are both functions of ρ and θ as it would be given by (15) and (16). The
first order condition for profit maximization can be derived as follows (see Appendix 2)
∂pi1
∂ρ
=
∂r0
∂ρ
[
−(R− r1) δ
b2 − δ2 − ρ
2b
δ(1 + θ)
{
r1
b
b2 − δ2 +D1
}]
. (17)
Here ∂r0
∂ρ
> 0. So for the whole expression to be zero, the terms in square brackets must
add up to zero. The first term is negative, and the second term will be positive if and only
if ρ < 0. That is, the private bank offers profit-linked incentives to its manager.
Finally, consider the government’s optimization which determines optimal θ. In this
section we assume that government is purely social welfare maximizer, and therefore β = 1.
The fact that deposits are differentiated (δ < b) ensures that profit will be positive if the
first bank is fully nationalized. By maximizing W (r0, r1) with respect to θ we get
∂W
∂θ
=
∂W
∂r0
∂r0
∂θ
+
∂W
∂r1
∂r1
∂θ
=
∂r0
∂θ
[
∂W
∂r0
+
∂W
∂r1
δ
2b
]
.
Since ∂r0
∂θ
> 0, the sign of ∂W
∂θ
critically depends on both ∂W
∂r0
and ∂W
∂r1
. Of these, first it
can be shown that ∂W
∂r1
> 0 (see Appendix 3). Next the sign of ∂W
∂r0
needs to be determined.
If this is non-negative, then complete nationalization is optimal. But if this is negative,
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then privatization (partial or complete) will be optimal. From the choice of the interest
rate reaction function of the public bank we know that ∂W
∂r0
= 0 only when θ = 1. Under
partial (or complete) privatization it is either positive or negative.
To ascertain this sign recall (13) and in particular r˜0 and rˆ0. Also recall that by
definition at r˜0,
∂W
∂r0
= 0. If b ≥ 2δ, then r˜0 > rˆ0 at all r1. Therefore, the equilibrium r0
cannot exceed r˜0, which means
∂W
∂r0
must be non-negative. Hence, the first order condition
in the government’s optimization yields ∂W
∂θ
> 0, which implies that θ = 1 is optimal. In
other words, ‘no privatization’ is optimal. This is shown in figure 3a in terms of interest
reaction functions. The reaction function of a fully public bank r˜0(r1) lies to the right of
the reaction function of the fully private bank rˆ0(r1). The resultant equilibrium in this
case is given by point E which corresponds to complete nationalization of the first bank
and a profit-oriented incentive scheme in the second bank.
On the other hand, if 2δ > b then r˜0 < (≥)rˆ1 at all r1 < (≥)R (2δ−b)δ . Then it is
possible that in equilibrium we may have r˜0 < r0 < rˆ0 (which is equivalent to saying that
the equilibrium r1 < R
(2δ−b)
δ
). In that case, we will have ∂W
∂r0
< 0 which gives rise to the
possibility that ∂W
∂θ
= 0 implying partial privatization. Figure 3b shows that the reaction
function of a fully nationalized bank will lie to the left of the fully private bank’s reaction
function. Here, the first bank is partially privatized leading to a reaction function which
is a weighted average of r˜0(r1) and rˆ0(r1). The resultant equilibrium is E
′.
Proposition 3 Under interest rate competition, the private bank will offer a profit-oriented
(or deposit-penalizing) incentive scheme to its manager by choosing ρ < 0, while the public
bank may or may not be privatized. When b ≥ 2δ, the public bank is not privatized at all.
When b < 2δ, partial privatization may occur.
As was the case with deposit competition, managerial incentives are found to be an
effective means of protecting (and even enhancing) profit, which would otherwise be eaten
away by the rival bank’s nationalization. However, the total industry profit will not remain
unchanged in this case, because of the product differentiation. Since r1 < R and r0 < R,
profit is always positive.
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Notably, now the incentive is in the direction of profit. The manager will be induced
to lower the interest rate by making him more cost-sensitive. The public bank also recip-
rocates by reducing its interest rate due to strategic complementarity of the two interest
rates (see Fershtman and Judd, 1987). As for privatization, the government faces two
opposite concerns: induce an increase in the interest rate in the first market so that the
depositor surplus would rise, but also pay attention to the adverse effect that the second
market would suffer in the process.
The intensity of the tension between these two concerns depends on the magnitude of
δ relative to b. When δ is fairly small (i.e. when the two markets are fairly apart), the
effect of an increase in r0 will have a muted effect on the second market. The government,
therefore, would like to raise r0 toward R by going for complete nationalization; the private
bank does its best by offering profit-oriented incentives (see figure 3a). On the other hand,
when δ is sufficiently large (in the sense that 2δ > b) two markets are very close, and the
concern for the effect on the second market overrides the desire to raise r0. In this case,
the government is accommodative (see figure 3b). In fact, it is so accommodative that
often it would set an interest rate (r0) well below the optimal level of a fully private bank.
Here privatization helps to increase the interest rate a bit and in turn the depositor surplus
increases as well.
(Insert Figure 3 here)
5 Conclusion
This paper explores optimal partial privatization and managerial incentives in the frame-
work of a ‘mixed oligopoly’ involving a partly divested public bank. We show that if the
government is profit oriented, then the public bank has to be partially privatized, and in
response the private bank will offer revenue-linked incentives to its manager. But privati-
zation will be greater than in the case where the private bank does not offer managerial
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incentives. Thus, managerial incentives and partial privatization appear to be integral fea-
tures of mixed duopoly. Moreover, profit orientation and managerial incentives appear to
be playing two distinct roles. Profit orientation determines the industry profit and manage-
rial incentives determine its distribution between the two banks. This merely redistributive
role of managerial incentive seems to be possible only in a mixed duopoly.
A policy implication of this result is that a profit oriented government should be pre-
pared to privatize the state owned bank when faced with aggressive strategies by the private
bank e.g. managerial incentives. Although accommodating the private bank’s aggression
hurts the public bank’s profit but it prevents an erosion of industry profit which is impor-
tant for financial stability. We also consider the case of interest rate competition where
we show that while the private bank’s strategy is to offer profit-linked incentives, even a
purely welfare maximizing government chooses partial privatization when the two deposits
are close substitutes. However the government opts for full nationalization when the two
deposits are sufficiently differentiated. This result implies that the government will face
pressure to privatize the state owned bank if it competes with the private bank in a related
market but can choose to fully nationalize if the two markets are sufficiently segmented.
Our analysis sheds some light on the recent global financial crisis, which started in 2007.
Many banks and financial institutions have been nationalized or received government bail-
outs to protect depositors’ interests. Though we have not modeled bank competition in
the loan market, it is foreseeable that our model can be extended in this direction and the
consequences of aggressive (and irresponsible) lending (effected by managerial incentives),
which is believed to be a cause of the crisis, can be suitably studied. On the deposit
side, we can say that nationalization helps to protect the depositors’ interest in times of
crisis. Our analysis shows that when the government nationalizes one bank other private
banks may offer more aggressive incentives to their managers to mobilize deposits; but
such interactions between public and private banks may be good for the economy provided
the competition in the loan market does not encourage excessive risk taking.
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APPENDIX 1: EFFECTS OF ρ AND θ ON r0 AND r1
From (15) and (16) we derive the following
∂r0
∂ρ
=
Rbδ(1 + θ)
[4b2 − δ2(1 + θ)](1− ρ)2 > 0,
∂r1
∂ρ
=
∂r0
∂ρ
2b
δ(1 + θ)
> 0,
∂r0
∂θ
=
4Rb
[4b2 − δ2(1 + θ)]2(1− ρ)
[
2b2(b− 2δ)(1− ρ) + δ3(1− ρ) + b2δ] > 0,
∂r1
∂θ
=
∂r0
∂θ
δ
2b
> 0.
Since 2b > δ(1 + θ), we have ∂r1
∂ρ
> ∂r0
∂ρ
and ∂r1
∂θ
< ∂r0
∂θ
.
APPENDIX 2: DERIVATION OF EQUATION (17)
Consider the private bank owner’s maximization problem
∂pi1
∂ρ
= (R− r1)∂D1
∂r0
∂r0
∂ρ
+
[
(R− r1)∂D1
∂r1
−D1
]
∂r1
∂ρ
.
Substituting the first order condition of the manager’s optimization problem (regarding
the choice of r1) we replace [(R − r1)∂D1∂r1 − D1] by [−ρ
{
r1
∂D1
∂r1
+D1
}
], and rewrite the
owner’s first order condition as
∂pi1
∂ρ
= (R− r1)∂D1
∂r0
∂r0
∂ρ
+
[
−ρ
{
r1
∂D1
∂r1
+D1
}]
∂r1
∂ρ
.
Further substitute ∂D1
∂r0
= − δ
b2−δ2 ,
∂D1
∂r1
= b
b2−δ2 and
∂r1
∂ρ
= ∂r0
∂ρ
2b
δ(1+θ)
and obtain (17).
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APPENDIX 3: PROOF OF ∂W
∂r1
> 0
From the expression of W we derive the following
∂W
∂r1
= R
(
∂D0
∂r1
+
∂D1
∂r1
)
− ∂C
∂D0
∂D0
∂r1
− ∂C
∂D1
∂D1
∂r1
= R
(
− δ
b2 − δ2 +
b
b2 − δ2
)
+ r0
δ
b2 − δ2 − r1
b
b2 − δ2
= (R− r1) b
b2 − δ2 − (R− r0)
δ
b2 − δ2 .
To ascertain the sign of ∂W
∂r1
we need to compare r1 and r0. We first show that if ρ ≤ 0
and θ ≤ 1, then r1(ρ, θ) ≤ r0(ρ, δ). From (15) and (16) note that r1(.) ≤ r0(.) implies
bδθ + (2b− δ) [(1− ρ){b(1 + θ)− 2δθ} − b] ≥ 0.
The first term is clearly non-negative. For the second term to be non-negative, we must
have (1−ρ){b(1+θ)−2δθ} ≥ b. Examine this inequality by setting the lowest value of the
left hand side expression. Since b(1 + θ)− 2δθ is increasing (non-increasing) if b > (≤)2δ,
the lowest value of the left hand side expression occurs at θ = 0 (when b > 2δ), in which
case the inequality reduces to (1− ρ)b ≥ b, which clearly holds due to the fact that ρ ≤ 0.
Similarly, if b ≤ 2δ, evaluate the inequality at θ = 1, which gives (1− ρ)2(b− θ) ≥ b. This
also clearly holds. Hence, at all ρ ≤ 0, θ ∈ [0, 1] we have (1− ρ){b(1 + θ)− 2δθ} ≥ b which
implies r1 < r0. Consequently (R − r1) > (R − r0) and given b > δ we can conclude that
∂W
∂r1
> 0.
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Figure 1: Deposit reaction functions
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Figure 2: Equilibrium privatization and managerial incentives
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